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Abstract 
 
Information Security Trust and Outcomes:  
A Case Study of Compliance in a Complex System 
 
 
Robert Dutcher Stiles, Jr., MSIMS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Hüseyin Tanriverdi 
 
As recent high-profile data breaches illustrate, an organization that complies with 
information security control frameworks can also suffer from successful attacks and the 
subsequent erosion of trust.   Information security frameworks used in the federal, 
payment, and health care industries use a core catalogue of security controls to 
standardize practices and facilitate assessment.   In theory, an organization implementing 
these standard controls and practices would maintain sufficient security to protect 
sensitive data.  However, these catalogues of controls require resources to implement and 
change slowly compared to the evolution of technology and threats. Viewed as a static set 
of rules in a dynamic complex system, the implementation of catalogues of controls may 
not create predictable outcomes, or act as reliable indicators of the quality of an 
organization’s security program.  I used a case study approach to analyze an 
organization’s security outcomes during a period when control catalogue implementation 
 v 
transitioned from a best practice to a regulatory mandate   I analyzed the organization 
through the perspective of a complex adaptive system, identifying the complex properties 
of the organization and its information security team as they endeavored to ensure strict 
compliance with the control catalogues.   I collected data on factors related to the 
organization’s security outcomes, as well as finances, strategy, and governance.   Despite 
significant changes in IT intensity, strategy, and corporate leadership, the security 
outcomes faltered and recovered, as emergent processes evolved from the dynamic 
environment. The compliance results, however, were ambiguous.  The formal third-party 
compliance assessment presented outcomes that overstated the impact of isolated controls 
from the catalogue, while failing to highlight the broader issues related to organizational 
risk. This prevented the compliance assessment from representing the true state of 
security of the organization’s systems. I conclude that the current method of assessing the 
quality of an organization’s information security program against a control catalogue 
does not provide sufficient information to establish meaningful trust between 
organizations. Alternate method that requires a broader perspective of risk may improve 
the reliability of assessments and provide a more meaningful method to communicate 
trust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Equifax is one of the three primary credit reporting agencies in the US, 
maintaining data on over 800 million individuals, with over 88 million business 
customers.  In July 2017, Equifax’s security team became aware that unauthorized 
individuals had exploited a vulnerability in the Apache Struts software that supported an 
internet consumer application.  Later investigation identified that the exploit of this 
vulnerability eventually led to the disclosure of the personal financial profiles of over 145 
million consumers (Equifax, 2017a).  While the attack and investigations were ongoing, 
Equifax continued to tout their high level of information security compliance on its 
website.  Equifax promoted their consumer and business products with certifications of 
SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2013, and an Authority to Operate under the FISMA’s 
standards.  These certifications required the independent assessment of hundreds of 
individual security controls and processes defined by the Association of Independent 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
respectively.  The certifications signaled that not only did Equifax believe the data was 
secure, these institutions came in and proved it.  Equifax accompanied the certifications 
with their statement that “[l]eadership in security is fundamental to our basic purpose – 
empowering businesses and consumers with information they can trust.”  As news of the 
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data breach spread, customer trust in Equifax’s security certifications crumbled.  In the 
November 2017 filing with the SEC, Equifax interim CEO stated that Equifax has “an 
important journey in front of us to regain the trust and confidence of consumers and our 
business customers” (Equifax, 2017b). 
Equifax was in simultaneous compliant and breached states.  Despite its 
adherence to compliance standards Equifax breached the trust of its business partners and 
140 million consumers.  This paper will examine how organizations, collected together in 
“trust frameworks,” use certifications that assess against control catalogues to signal and 
communicate trust, and whether compliance with these catalogues and certifications have 
a reliable and constant impact on security outcomes.  Recent research on security 
breaches using the growing datasets of security failures currently dwarfs the research on 
compliance and the structure of security regulations.  The existing academic and industry 
control catalogue research focuses on efficient and effective implementation of 
catalogues of controls, and not whether these catalogues achieve a goal of improving 
security outcomes.  Organizations assume, and do not question, the guaranteed 
effectiveness of the control catalogues  
Research into the fundamental effectiveness of security compliance control 
catalogue frameworks may be rare for several reasons.  Challenges include the difficulty 
in acquiring the detailed information on compliance implementations, and the relative 
immaturity of the field of security compliance.  The issues of security compliance 
fundamentals and the structure of the compliance requirements are nonetheless critical in 
enabling cost-effective business over the internet. 
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Groups of organizations described as “trust frameworks” develop compliance 
frameworks, including control catalogues (Leszcz, 2017).  Trust frameworks develop a 
common set of rules to govern a set of business processes between organizations. The 
value of a common framework is to avoid the need for each organization to conduct due 
diligence on every other participating organization, while providing common formats for 
data transfer, rules for processing, and levels of information security.   
For information security, the frameworks are often supported by a detailed control 
catalogue.  In this paper, I define control catalogues as lists of computer security practices 
designed to protect information and systems.  The control catalogue developed for 
compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) defines a 
control as “a safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an 
organization designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its 
information and to meet a set of defined security requirements” (Ross, 2013).  The 
frameworks collect these individual safeguards into a list, grouped together by process or 
control objective.  Control catalogues are part of the security compliance frameworks for 
federal contractors and agencies (NIST Special Publication 800-53 Appendix F and J), 
entities involved in payment card processing (PCI-DSS), cloud service providers that 
wish to store federal data (FEDRAMP), and health care providers and their business 
associates (HIPAA Security Rule and HITECH).  Voluntary compliance frameworks like 
the ISO 27000 series and the omnibus compliance certification HITRUST include control 
catalogues in their frameworks as well.  A perspective on these frameworks would be to 
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provide a common set of security best practices for organizations to meet a variety of 
security needs.  
The goal of a common set of best practices may not be met, as each catalogue 
evolve to meet different data protection requirements.  An examination of a control 
across various control catalogues can demonstrate the variety of approaches to the same 
protection.  Passwords are a common control and addressed by nearly all control 
catalogues.  The ISO 27002:2013 standard’s reference control for passwords includes 
guidance on seven requirements.  The requirement for password quality includes five 
properties, including “easy to remember” and “not vulnerable to dictionary attacks” 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2013).  The Identification and 
Authentication control (IA-5) for FISMA compliance digs deeper.  IA-5 contains 10 
requirements for an organization to develop an authenticator.  In addition, a moderate 
implementation includes four control enhancements.  Control enhancement IA-5(1) lists 
five requirements for passwords, including requirements for the organization to define 
password complexity, to only store and transmit encrypted passwords, and to prohibit 
password reuse (Ross, 2013).  The PCI-DSS v3.2 Requirement 8 specifies the password 
requirements in greater detail.  The 24 parts of Requirement 8 leave less to the 
organization’s discretion.  It defines complexity as “at least seven characters” and 
“contains both numeric and alphabetic characters” (PCI Security Standards Council, 
2016).  This variety of guidance from organizations demonstrates that there is not a 
common approach to the simple control of defining a user password.   
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For most organizations, implementing a single information security framework is 
not optional.  The United States’ sectoral approach to privacy and security regulation, 
combined with individual contract requirements, ensures that an organization that stores 
or processes data on individuals will implement at least one of these control catalogues.  
Mapping these controls from one compliance framework to another spawned a small 
industry, including the HITRUST framework (HITRUST, 2017), which provides 
certifications across its meta-framework that includes HIPAA, PCI-DSS, and ISO 
catalogues.  Certifications for individuals to map controls from one catalogue to another 
developed to address the issue of compliance with multiple control catalogues ((ISC)2, 
n.d.).   
The task of sorting through the myriad controls falls on an organization’s 
information security team.  These information security teams must then justify the 
resources to implement and assess these frameworks to help establish business trust, 
minimize compliance risk, and assist in communicating information security performance 
to management.  Compliance certifications establish trust between business partners, as 
mentioned in the Equifax case, and are often part of a vendor management program. 
Certifications like the ISO 2700 series and AICPA’s Service Organization Controls 
(SOC) provide the outside world a glimpse at an organization’s interior information 
security processes and controls.  The AICPA identifies three customers for its 2017 SOC 
for cybersecurity attestation: investors, business partners, and industry regulators: three 
parties that business must establish trust to succeed (AICPA, 2017).  Secondly, the cost 
and impact of failure to comply with these control frameworks vary significantly by 
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industry.  Frameworks like PCI-DSS for payment cards, and FISMA for federal agencies 
and contractors require annual certifications by third parties designated or certified by the 
regulator.  The risk of non-compliance is significant, as the federal government can 
terminate a contract or increase an agency’s audit burden, while the PCI can assess fines, 
or prevent a company from accepting payment cards.  Other regulators wait for violations 
to come to their attention before acting.  For example, HIPAA for health information, or 
the FTC for non-bank financial institutions under the GLBA rely on an institution to self-
report, or other public disclosures.  Finally, management can use the maintenance of a 
security framework as a clear and visible measure of information security.  Establishing 
metrics and communicating effectiveness of an information security program continues to 
challenge corporate information security teams.  Reporting activities benchmarked 
against an externally defined security framework provide a shortcut to demonstrate to 
management that the information security program is working.   
 The benefits of trust, compliance risk mitigation, and reporting are designed into 
most information security frameworks and their control catalogues.  However, the 
primary principle behind all the frameworks is to establish a baseline of information 
security.  The FISMA framework contains a typical statement, that “security controls are 
the safeguards/countermeasures prescribed for information systems or organizations that 
are designed to: (i) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information 
that is processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems/organizations; and (ii) satisfy a 
set of defined security requirements” (Ross, 2013).   So, the question is, does this method 
of prescribing control catalogues meet the objective of improved security?  What 
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relationship, if any, exists between an organization’s investment in control catalogue 
compliance and the security of the organization’s information assets?  
I study this question through a case study of an organization’s implementation of 
the FISMA catalogue of controls.  I review data on how the organization measures their 
success, communicates information security to management, and governs information 
technology while the organization engages in changes to strategy, leadership, and 
regulatory burden.  I also review measures of security outcomes, including penetration 
tests and the FISMA assessments.  I analyze this data from the perspective of the 
organization as a complex adaptive system.   
The paper begins with a discussion of the current research on information security 
outcomes and compliance.  I introduce the theory of information security as a complex 
system to frame the research.  I define the questions regarding the impact of control 
catalogues on security outcomes and propose a hypothesis.   I introduce the case study, 
including the background of the organization and the data collection methods.  I present 
the results and demonstrate the relationship between these variables as the organization 
undergoes changes in strategy, leadership, and regulation.  Finally, I discuss the 
outcomes, and conclude on the hypothesis.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The young field of information security and information security compliance 
presents several challenges in examining prior research.  As a young field, the body of 
research is not extensive, and a consensus approach to research is not common.  The 
discipline’s youth contributes to a lack of a shared lexicon.  For example, the literature 
often uses the words “cybersecurity,” “data security,” and “information security” to 
describe the same concept.  A variety of disciplines, primarily business and computer 
science, brings its own set of theories and methods to researching information security.    
An early example of research into the dynamics between controls, compliance, 
and trust addressed the US military’s standards for security for computer systems 
developed by contractors, commonly called “The Orange Book” and later, as it expanded 
outside the military, “Common Criteria.”  These standards may not have achieved their 
goal of a “rich supply of high-assurance systems,” but research indicated that they did 
“move the bar by motivating vendors to include security controls in their products” 
(Lipner, 2015).  Ross Anderson addressed the failings of Common Criteria certification 
for systems in 2001, identifying the “perverse incentives” and economic pressures 
between the certifying body and system vendor.  These factors, he argues, may lead to 
certifications that are “irrelevant, erroneous or misleading” (Anderson, 2001).   
Heartland Systems suffered a high-profile breach of payment card data in 2008.  
Robert Carr, Heartland’s CEO, discussed the benefits and pitfalls of the PCI standard 
from his perspective in 2010.  Carr acknowledged the utility of PCI controls as 
establishing a “minimum standard,” but identified opportunities for improvement in the 
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PCI process that assesses compliance.  Certified assessors deemed Heartland compliant 
over a period of years without identifying the flaw in Heartland’s system that led to the 
data breach (Cheney, 2010).  In support of discussion by US lawmakers on policy options 
in the wake of the Target, Sony, JPMorgan, and other data breaches, the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) provided research that demonstrated the unsettled nature of 
establishing effective security controls for payment systems.  This research provided four 
different estimates of the cost of the breach to Target ranging from $4.9 billion to $11 
million, pulling from three different researchers and Target itself.  The CRS also 
identified the weakness with the magstripe and signature method of payment card 
verification, and cited the industry’s reluctance to adapt more secure standards based on 
cost and convenience (Weiss, N.E. and Miller, R.S., 2015).  Verizon Business, a PCI 
certified assessor, publishes an annual report on the state of PCI compliance, based on 
their assessment activities.  This research charts a positive trend in the ability of 
organizations to maintain compliance with the standards, but the trend started at a low 
point.  In 2011, 11% of organizations were compliant when Verizon conducted the 
interim assessment.  By 2017, the compliant percentage rose to 55% (van Oosten, 2017).  
The rise of catalogues of controls to improve security outcomes appear to be met by 
challenges to their effectiveness and the ability to provide accurate assessment.  
In 2008, IBM’s Klaus Julisch announced security compliance as the next frontier 
in security research.  While that frontier still appears unsettled, Julisch’s paper provided a 
useful definition of security compliance as “the state of conformance with externally 
imposed functional security requirements and of providing evidence (assurance) thereof” 
 10 
(Julisch, 2008).  His subsequent paper on compliance by design (Julisch, Suter, Woitalla, 
and Zimmermann, 2011) focused primarily on a method of reliable implementation of 
control frameworks, rather than determining the effectiveness or adequacy of the 
framework.  Likewise Coffman approached methods for developing a “risk aware” 
compliance system to remediate computer system vulnerabilities, with a focus on 
maximizing compliance efficiency with limited resources through risk calculations 
(Coffman, Agrawal, and Schaffa, 2013). Hayden outlined a method to manage the 
implementation of multiple control frameworks through a common control framework, 
since the control frameworks all identify similar security best practices (Hayden, 2009).   
Solis suggested that the implementation of automated controls for compliance saves 
money and provides an opportunity for “operational excellence” (Sollis, 2010).  
Promoters of quantifiable risk assessments for information security view the assessor as 
just another threat, to be measured and mitigated accordingly.  Aligned with this 
perspective, they see little value in control framework adoption, since the frameworks fail 
to “describe the nature of the controls, the relationship between controls, or how to 
measure/estimate the effectiveness of controls within a risk analysis” (Freund and Jones, 
2015).  Two venerable computer security scientists, Steve Lipner and Butler Lampson, 
responded to NIST’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity request for input 
on FISMA guidelines by stating that the “ultimate test of a cybersecurity program is how 
well it protects systems and information, and current government practices are not 
passing this test.”  Lipner and Lampson specifically called out the control catalogues in 
the FISMA guidance (NIST SP 800-53) and cited the information security failures at the 
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State Department, Office of Personnel Management, and IRS (Lipner and Lampson, 
2016).  
Another research approach to the problem of information security compliance 
examines security failures.  Information security researchers examine the newly available 
data on security failures and data breaches.  Sources like Verizon Business’ annual Data 
Breach Report and the Data Breach Clearinghouse provide an ongoing chronicle of 
security failure.  Predictive models for data breaches built on this data provide a risk 
score for security failures (Liu et al., 2015).  The goal of this model is to predict breaches, 
rather than to identify causal elements that would assist in identifying patterns of failure, 
including compliance failures, within the organizations examined.   
The breach data research dispels some underlying assumptions regarding the 
trends in security breach impact and frequency (Edwards, Hofmeyr, & Forrest, 2016), 
and new estimates on cost per incident (Romanosky, 2016).  This research runs counter to 
common, and widely cited industry survey results.  For example, the Ponemon Institute’s 
2017 report estimated $2 million per breach (Ponemon, 2017), while Romanosky’s 
estimate is closer to $200,000.  These lines of research provide important insights into the 
impacts of control failure but provide less insight into the contribution of compliance to 
the success or failure of the organization.   
The review of the literature demonstrates that there is not a consensus on the 
ability of control frameworks to deliver consistent security outcomes.  One theme that 
recurs in the literature is the challenge to implement and maintain the controls.  Another 
is the difficulty to assess the controls in a reliable way to demonstrate a state of security, 
 12 
and expected security outcomes, to third parties.  I will examine this inconsistency in the 
literature through a case study of an organization and their implementation of information 
security control catalogues. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
After the 2007 financial crises, the accounting profession researched their own 
financial reporting compliance problem by examining the dynamics between auditors, 
financial institutions, and “governance, risk, and compliance” (GRC) methods.  Michael 
Power’s essay “The Risk Management of Nothing” (Power, 2009) focused on the concept 
of “risk appetite” and the inadequacies of metrics-driven Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) systems. He stated that ERM models should begin “to break free from regarding 
appetite solely as a ‘thing’ to be measured and to recognize it as a dynamic construction 
involving values and the situational experience of a multitude of organizational agents.”  
Power uses the language and approach of complexity theory, as will be discussed later.  
Other research created models to try to correct the failures of the auditing standards that 
were intended to mitigate the causes of financial collapse.  Some research described a 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief systems for risk assessment (Mock, Sun, Srivastava, & 
Vasarhelyi, 2009).  The use of Bayesian analysis and belief systems is at the heart of 
Douglas Hubbard’s work on risk management (Hubbard, 2009).  These approaches are 
focused on the broader issue of risk assessment, of which controls and compliance are 
only two components.    
The complexity theory approach as described in Power’s paper is the most 
appropriate for my research question.   Complexity theory is a multidisciplinary approach 
to address the interactions between agents, and the potentially disproportionate impact of 
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their actions.  First explored in the biological and physical sciences, complexity theory 
began to be applied to organizational behavior in the late 1990s, since traditional models 
did not have the power to explain why “organizations with nearly identical components 
have divergent results” (Grobman, 2005).  Philip Anderson’s description of  complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) in organizations better explained the disparity between the 
traditional planning and outcomes (Anderson, 1999).  Complexity theory has also been 
used to describe some organizational information security behavior (Burns, Posey, 
Courtney, Roberts, & Nanayakkara, 2017), and cyberwarfare (Phister, 2010). 
Complexity theory was derived from observations in the natural sciences of self-
organizing systems that do not appear to follow a single pattern.  Examples include the 
behavior of bee and ant colonies, where individual insects operate together to achieve an 
objective without any central controlling structure.  Concepts of self-similarity, chaos, 
and the “butterfly effect” fall under the larger study of complexity theory.  In 
Complexity: A Guided Tour, Melanie Mitchell described the three principles of complex 
systems: complex collective behavior, signaling and information processing, and 
adaptation.  (Mitchell, 2009).  In complex systems, individual components, or agents, act 
according to a set of rules, or schema, with the agents’ schema creating a reaction to the 
agents that surround it.  The agents also communicate with each other, recognizing and 
processing the information signals sent from other agents.  The system adapts to changes 
in the environment.  These primary concepts contribute to phenomena in network effects, 
evolution of organizations, and power law, rather than normal distribution of effects.   
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A property of complex adaptive systems within an organization is the ability to 
create unpredictable results.  Individual agents connect within the rules established by the 
organization, but also establish information shadow systems and develop their own 
schema to achieve their self-defined objectives.  The shadow systems are non-linear, and 
“unexpected actions are likely to be produced” (Stacey, 1996).  Instability, or chaos, in an 
organization can “amplify small changes in the environment, causing the instability 
necessary to transform an existing pattern of behavior into a new, more appropriate one” 
(Burnes, 2005).   
In this paper, I use the principles of complex systems to describe the dynamic 
tensions between information security, compliance control catalogues, and disruptive 
events in the organization.  These tensions may lead to a state where compliance 
catalogues of control would fail to meet their planned objectives of information security, 
and consequently reduce the ability of an organization to protect itself.  
The compliance framework, including the catalogue of controls, contains 
elements from three complex systems interacting with each other, but with their own 
objectives and dynamics.  These systems are self-similar, or fractal, as each resembles the 
other as agents follow the same set of schemas, in this instance control catalogues. 
The highest level of compliance systems is at the governing or regulatory body 
that drafts and enforces the compliance rules.  Examples include the PCI Council and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  The complex collective behavior is 
demonstrated in the rulemaking and enforcement processes, as the organization seeks to 
collect and process information on control implementations, as well as evaluations of 
 16 
assets and threats, from its members.  The PCI Council, for example, includes members 
from different participating organizations, while NIST seeks input from federal agencies 
and organizations when developing rules.  These communications with other 
organizations include the second component of a complex system, information signaling 
and processing.  The governing body distributes draft rules and holds meetings to discuss 
the proposed framework.  Based on the communications from the members of the 
framework, the governing or regulatory body adapts, making changes to the control 
catalogues.  Since changes to the catalogues require implementation by the regulated 
organizations, the governing bodies seek consensus from their member organizations, and 
the changes to the control catalogues occur at a rate much slower than the changes to 
technology or organizations.  Nonetheless, these changes reflect the divergent paths in 
defining controls as illustrated above regarding password rules and demonstrate how the 
complex system property of similar objectives can lead to differing results.   
 At the next level is the organization which is both governed by these regulations 
and required to implement the control catalogues.  The organization demonstrates 
complex collective behavior as it interacts with vendors, customers, regulators, and other 
business partners.  The implementation of the control catalogues may impact how these 
collective behaviors occur, defining the terms and limits of these relationships.  
Organizations signal and process information through contract negotiations, public 
statements, and display of certifications.  The Equifax displays of compliance 
certifications on its website, and in its quarterly filings with the SEC, illustrate this 
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property of a complex system.  The organization also adapts to its environment, including 
compliance requirements as well as the changes in financial and stakeholder objectives.   
 The final complex system is at the level of individual teams within the 
organization.  Although the information security team typically implements the controls 
required to comply with the compliance framework, this team of individuals must also 
collaborate with the other teams within the organization to accomplish their tasks.  They 
signal and process information from organizational leadership regarding their progress 
and priorities.   Changes to the organizational environment, including new business lines 
and changing stakeholder priorities, require the information security team to change and 
adapt their processes.   
 Information security systems by their nature interact with another complex system 
that behaves outside of the trust framework, but gives it meaning: the threat system.  The 
threat system is defined as a system that attempts to breach the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of protected information assets.  These threat systems are diverse in their 
composition, motivations, and methods.  Threats to information systems include nation-
state actors, large networks of organized criminals, and single opportunistic individuals.  
The threat system can operate within the organization as an “insider threat.”  Vendors, 
employees, contractors, and customers may all act as agents in the larger threat system.   
How do these complex systems influence the relationship between control 
catalogues and security outcomes?  The governing bodies develop the control catalogues 
in complex system separate from the organization, and the information security team that 
is required to deploy them.  The catalogues are also separate from the complex system of 
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the threats seeking to penetrate the organization.  The compliance framework and control 
catalogues can influence the ability and format of the information security team’s 
communication within the organization.  The security team’s response to threats may be 
framed by their implementation of a catalogue of controls.  In terms of complexity 
theory, the agents of the information security team are handed the schema developed by 
the trust framework and are expected to adapt to the systems of the organization and the 
threats.  This dynamic may not produce the expected security outcomes since the 
schema/control catalogue may be implanted in the organization’s systems without 
consideration of the existing environment.   Even with a common set of rules, the initial 
conditions of each organization differ, and lead to divergent outcomes, and emergent 
random behavior.  Complex systems are sensitive to initial conditions, and “the behavior 
of some simple, deterministic systems can be impossible, even in principle, to predict in 
the long term” (Mitchell, 2009).  The catalogue of controls may inhibit the organization’s 
ability to evolve in response to the threat information signals and environment.  
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METHODOLOGY 
This research uses a case study approach to analyze the complex systems of a 
trust framework within an organization and the organization’s information security team.  
The research uses the three properties of a complex system: complex behavior, 
information communication, and adaptability.  The case study identifies the impact of the 
control catalogue on the ability of each system to meet its goal of improving security 
outcomes.  I present the case study as the organization changes strategy, leadership, 
regulatory mandate, and IT investment.  I selected the case study approach for its ability 
to examine the relationships between the regulator, the organization’s leadership, and the 
information security team in sufficient detail to identify the dynamics of the complex 
adaptive systems. 
 I selected the case study organization due to the ability to examine the changes to 
leadership and strategy.  Individuals with extensive knowledge of the history of the 
organization were available for interviews.  The organization permitted this research on 
the condition that neither the organization nor its industry be identified.  This paper refers 
to the organization as YZ Corporation, and its regulator as the Department.  After the 
narrative of the history of the organization, I describe the methods of information 
collected.  I use the information to identify the properties of the complex system, how it 
signals and processes information, and how it adapts to its environment.  The information 
will also provide measures of the organization’s security outcomes.  
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Background on Case Study – YZ Corporation 
 
YZ Corporation is a non-profit organization, established in the 1980s to serve a 
federal program.  As YZ grew, it increased revenue through expanding its area of service 
and innovating within a set of federal and state regulations.  By 2008, YZ employed over 
700 people with revenue over expenses of $80 million.  YZ’s customers included both 
institutions and individuals.  YZ’s primary business required it to collect and maintain 
several million records containing the non-public personal information (NPI) of 
individuals.   
YZ adopted e-commerce early, using the internet to facilitate its social mission, 
and to accelerate financial transactions and data transfers with institutional partners.  
Beginning in 1995, YZ recruited a large team of developers to integrate e-commerce and 
data exchanges with existing mainframe processes, including the development of 
standards in coordination with partner institutions.  The organization developed a Project 
Management Office and tied corporate compensation to the completion of strategic 
projects.  From 1995 to 2000, the number of developers grew to nearly 25% of the 
organization, with approximately one third of them contractors.  The information security 
function remained static, consisting of three individuals who reported to an IT 
infrastructure manager.  The information security team administered access controls, 
configured the firewall, and maintained the business contingency/disaster recovery plans.  
YZ’s primary IT compliance obligation consisted of adherence to Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) controls as defined by the Federal Trade Commission.  The information 
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security team was responsible for completing, evaluating, and exchanging GLBA 
questionnaires from business partners.  
In 2006, YZ contracted with a system integrator to assist in a data management 
project.  During the testing phase of the project, a developer for the system integrator lost 
a device that contained data to be used for system testing.  The loss of the device was a 
significant event, since the “test data” was over one million records of production non-
public personal information representing current and past customers.  Once notified of 
the incident, YZ responded by mailing notifications to the impacted individuals, 
establishing a call center to respond to their questions, and creating a website to 
communicate updated information on the data loss.  YZ hired a law firm to assist in the 
response and initiated legal action against the systems integrator.  The news of the data 
breach was published on the front page of the local paper serving YZ’s community, as 
well as state and nationwide media.  YZ maintained communications with the 
Department throughout the process.  The Department required no additional actions other 
than those YZ performed.  Although some business partners performed additional due 
diligence on YZ’s information security practices, no business relationships were lost as a 
direct result of the data breach. 
In 2007, YZ contracted a security firm to conduct a penetration test of its network.  
The test identified several non-critical vulnerabilities, which the information security 
team remediated.  Also, in 2007, YZ created the position of Information Security Officer, 
and increased the number of security staff from three to five.  The Information Security 
Officer developed a security policy and procedure framework using ISO security 
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standards and NIST’s FISMA guidance as a baseline.  Although YZ was not required to 
comply with FISMA, the Information Security Officer selected NIST Risk Management 
Framework due to YZ’s connection to the federal government, and the potential to enable 
YZ to compete for future federal contracts. According to the Head of IT, YZ’s “approach 
to the FISMA control catalogue was that it was a set of good practices we could pick 
from” and YZ “implemented the controls we felt best improved security.”   
From 2007 to 2010 YZ expanded into new territories, providing new internet 
enabled services to its institutional customers.  To support the innovation, YZ focused on 
extensive software and enterprise architecture projects.  With significant reserves and 
growing revenue, YZ structured its incentive bonus system on the timely delivery of 
services to customers, rather than the cost to build the services. 
In 2009, YZ wanted to be prepared to bid on a federal contract and sought to hire 
a consulting firm to identify gaps between YZ’s existing security controls and those 
required by FISMA.  In October 2009, YZ management requested $170,000 from YZ’s 
board of directors, framing the engagement as a “compliance” effort.  In the presentation 
to the board, management described the FISMA compliance assurance as “critical to 
ensuring YZ’s systems are accredited for future competitive offerings.”  YZ contracted 
with a large international consulting firm to conduct the assessment.  The consulting firm 
presented their results to management in September 2010.  The consultants’ assessment 
recommended that YZ embark on a larger project that would include establishing a Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) system, designing a new network architecture for the 
internet-facing environments and documenting existing information security processes in 
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a manner compliant with NIST standards.  The consulting team would develop a Plan of 
Actions and Milestones (POAM) that would identify unremediated gaps between YZ’s 
controls and controls required by FISMA.  The consultants estimated the cost of this 
engagement to be $1.5 million. 
During the engagement, the consulting firm expanded the scope to address their 
discovery that YZ continued to use production NPI in the test environment.  The issue of 
production data in the test environment was a proximal cause of YZ’s 2006 data breach.  
YZ paid a total of $2.25 million to the consultants.  The consulting firm concluded its 
engagement in August 2011, delivering a POAM, information security policies and 
procedures derived from the consulting firm’s templates, a spreadsheet-based RBAC, and 
the deployment of intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, and data leak prevention 
products. 
In 2010, federal legislation was passed that would lead to a slow decline, and 
eventual end of YZ’s primary revenue source.  YZ management developed a strategy to 
identify alternative sources of revenue and placed its primary focus on bidding for a 
federal contract.  To prepare for the bid, YZ management began a renewed focus on 
implementing and documenting FISMA controls.  
In July 2012, YZ conducted its first lay-off of personnel, primarily employees that 
staffed functions made obsolete by the 2010 federal legislation.  
YZ’s Project Management Office continued to address the POAM items.  
Management identified the “POAM Project” as a high priority and used its on-time 
completion to calculate the level of year-end bonuses for corporate management and 
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staff.  Management allocated and prioritized resources to address the POAM items, while 
other IT areas tried to reclassify languishing infrastructure upgrade efforts as necessary to 
achieve FISMA compliance.  The initial POAM Project was completed in September 
2013.  In December 2013, the Information Security Officer found employment 
opportunities with another organization and management filled the position with senior 
member of the information security team.   
In January 2014, the information security team had 8 members in three areas: 
Security Operations Center (event monitoring and incident response), Access Control 
(maintaining the RBAC and managing access to internal and external systems), and 
Program Management (developing and maintaining policies and standards).  The security 
team changed its reporting relationship, so the Information Security Officer now reported 
directly to the senior executive in charge of IT.  IT management transferred the 
maintenance of the firewall and newly acquired security devices to the network support 
group, although the information security team remained responsible for the rules and 
configuration of these devices to maintain separation of duties.  
In March 2015, with no federal contract or alternative revenue stream 
forthcoming, the board of directors replaced the CEO with another YZ executive.  The 
new CEO designed a strategy to develop a new revenue generating business, identify 
potential organizations for acquisition, and create new alliances with other organizations 
within YZ’s primary business.  The CEO restructured the organization in April 2015 to 
align the organization with new strategic goals and reduce infrastructure costs.  The cost 
reductions included significant layoffs, primarily of IT staff.  The restructure eliminated 
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the project management office, application development, and enterprise architecture 
departments, with significant cuts to personnel in infrastructure and help desk support.  
The restructure reduced the information security team from 8 to 4 by layoffs, with two 
additional team members resigning in reaction to the cuts.  By October 2015, the 
remaining team consisted of two analysts and the Information Security Officer.  IT was 
no longer represented in senior leadership but reported to the new CFO.  To further 
reduce on-premise infrastructure costs, IT developed a strategy of leveraging cloud 
services whenever possible for replacement systems and storage.  Corporate goals and 
bonus calculations were now focused on cost reduction, rather than project completion.    
The primary reason for the reduction of the Information Security team was the 
organization’s pivot from focusing on a federal contract to seeking other sources of 
revenue.  Since the information security team presented their primary value as FISMA 
compliance, management saw no need to retain the staff since the new business 
opportunities would not require FISMA.  This action was part of a broader strategy based 
on the assumption that YZ had significantly overspent on compliance activities.  
According to the Information Security Officer, the new CFO characterized the 
compliance program as “gold plated.”  The Head of IT described the change between the 
two CEO approaches from “automatic approval for budget if it went to compliance” to 
“every dollar spent on compliance was challenged.”  
  Meanwhile, the Department began to conduct assessments of third party risk, 
based on recommendations from their Inspector General.  The Department’s Inspector 
General reported weaknesses in the Department’s information security as a “top 
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management challenge” since 2011.  In March 2015, the Department asked YZ and 
similar institutions to complete an information security self-assessment that closely 
mirrored the controls identified in the FISMA control catalogue.  In July 2015, just three 
months after YZ laid off most of their security staff, the Department issued a letter that 
required YZ and similar institutions to comply with FISMA standards as a demonstration 
of their administrative capability.  The Department requested YZ contract with a third 
party to conduct an independent assessment of YZ’s implementation of FISMA’s security 
controls.  YZ’s information security team and representatives of the similar institutions 
held periodic conference calls with the Department to determine the scope and depth of 
the Department’s expectations.  YZ hired a contractor to assist with documentation and 
later perform an assessment of YZ’s compliance with FISMA.  The initial assessment 
was performed in the summer of 2016, identifying several areas for remediation.  The 
CFO and Head of IT allocated resources to address the outstanding issues identified by 
the third-party assessor, primarily focusing on vulnerability management of the legacy 
system.  A second assessment by the same firm was conducted in 2017.  The Information 
Security Officer communicated to the Department when the assessments were complete, 
but the Department did not request copies of the reports. 
As part of its new strategy announced in April 2015, YZ planned for a division 
responsible for new revenue, which I reference as “New Division.”  YZ created New 
Division in 2016 and staffed it with leaders from outside the organization.  In the summer 
of 2016, New Division hired a sales team, and aggressively marketed its services in a 
competitive market.  The Head of Internal Audit related that management and the board 
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of directors anticipated that New Division “would act like a start-up, but with the 
resources of YZ.”  As YZ’s legacy revenue decreased, YZ planned that New Division’s 
revenue would replace it.  YZ provided services to New Division through a shared 
services agreement.  The shared services included IT and information security, as well as 
accounting, legal and human resources. 
New Division identified information compliance programs it would need to 
compete in the marketplace.  YZ’s Information Security Officer said that New Division 
was “making commitments that included compliance with HIPAA, PCI-DSS, ISO, as 
well as talking about a SOC2 assessment.  I don’t think they knew what this compliance 
would cost.”  The Information Security Officer made an initial review of the information 
security compliance requirements the New Division would need to implement and 
document.  According to the Head of IT, “by the time we started looking at what New 
Division wanted in terms of compliance, we were looking at over 900 controls.  Do we 
really need to implement these 900 plus controls?”  In early 2017, the Head of IT 
contracted with a local consulting firm to help in developing an information security 
compliance framework to address all YZ’s business lines, including New Division.  The 
local consulting firm offered their own consolidated control framework, including 
policies and procedures, that would map to these 900 controls.  In the summer of 2017, 
the Head of IT presented the policies and procedures to different business areas to solicit 
opinions and obtain commitment to the new control framework.  The Head of Internal 
Audit commented that, although the framework was comprehensive, it would require 
some additional customization to conform to YZ’s business processes.   
 28 
By March 2017, New Division provided services to four customers, with an 
operations staff of twelve and sales staff of five.  The technology YZ supported for New 
Division was a mix of both on-premise and cloud systems.  No independent third party 
had evaluated the security of New Division systems by the end of 2017, but vendor 
management teams from New Division customers had made on-site visits.  
Table 1 YZ Corporation Timeline 
2006 May Data breach 
2007  Position of Information Security Officer created 
2008   
2009 October FISMA consulting project approved by board of directors 
2010  Legislation ends YZ’s program 
Consultants begin FISMA gap assessment 
FISMA project begins 
2011 August Consultants complete FISMA gap assessment 
2012 April First layoff 
 
2013 July First security awareness quiz administered 
September First FISMA project completed 
 
 December  Change in Information Security Officers 
2014   
2015 April New leadership & strategy, with plans for New Division 
Reduction in force, primarily in IT 
 
July Department makes FISMA required for YZ 
2016  New Division begins operations 
 September First FISMA assessment report issued 
2017 September Second FISMA assessment report issued 
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Data Collection Methods  
Information on YZ’s control catalogue implementation and security outcomes 
was collected by the following methods.  
Interviews:   
I interviewed the following employees of YZ Corporation to better understand the 
dynamics between the information security compliance and outcomes as YZ underwent 
organizational changes.  I include the results of these interviews to add perspective and 
background to the quantitative and qualitative results. 
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Table 2 Interviews with YZ employees 
Title Background Interview 
Duration 
Topics of Interview 
Head of IT 
Division 
Former head of 
application 
development at YZ.  
Promoted to head of IT 
division in 2015 
reorganization.  Over 
10 years with YZ. 
One one-
hour, one 
half-hour 
session. 
The history of YZ Corporation, 
and its approach to information 
security.  
The approaches to information 
security compliance at YZ.  
YZ’s approach to information 
security risk.  
How changes in budget, staffing, 
and leadership influenced the 
ability of YZ to implement 
compliance control catalogues 
and manage security outcomes. 
YZ’s cloud strategy. 
Head of 
Information 
Security 
Promoted to head of 
security from security 
engineer in December 
2013.  With YZ from 
October 2011 to until 
December 2017. 
One-hour 
session 
Relationship between 
Information Security and other 
organizational units.  
Relationship between 
compliance and security.  
Impact on reduced resources in 
meeting security objectives.  
Impact of assessments 
(penetration tests, FISMA 
assessments).  
Relationship with the 
Department.  
Security 
Analyst 
Employed by YZ for 
over 25 years.  
Primary responsibilities 
in information security 
compliance and 
managing assessment 
engagements.  
Two 30-
minute 
sessions 
Relationship between 
Information Security and other 
organizational units.  
Compliance and security.  
Impact on reduced resources in 
meeting security objectives.  
Impact of assessments.  
Head of 
Internal Audit  
Led YZ’s internal audit 
function from August 
2015 to December 
2017.  
Two one-
hour 
sessions 
Approach of board of directors 
to information security.  
Background on internal audits of 
information security. 
Human 
Resources 
Trainer 
Administers the 
security awareness 
quiz. 
One half 
hour 
session 
Collection of quiz data, 
description of process. 
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 YZ provided me with documents and reports maintained by the organization that 
illustrate their information security and compliance programs.  These records were 
created, formatted, and retained to support an ongoing business.  I was unable to obtain 
some records that would illustrate YZ’s security and compliance programs, or records for 
a period that would better illustrate trends due to the practical demands of an ongoing 
business.    
This report uses the following information to assess YZ’s security and compliance 
outcomes, as well as variables that contribute to these outcomes.   
Penetration Test Reports: 
I collected and reviewed the results of the penetration tests of YZ’s internet 
accessible systems from 2012 to 2017.  The external penetration testing firm annually 
conducted two tests, one web and one external, and issued two reports.  The scope for 
each test did not change from one year to the next, however the tools and techniques used 
by the testing firm changed to align with evolving threats.  The web test identified 
vulnerabilities on YZ’s single web application for external customers.  The external test 
identified vulnerabilities in systems identified by the 128 public network addresses 
owned by YZ.  The firm prioritized the results, with the highest priority assigned to the 
vulnerabilities the penetration test team used to gain unauthorized access to YZ 
information assets.  The firm prioritized the other results according to security industry 
standards (CVSS, OWASP Top Ten).   
These tests were intended to simulate actual attacks on YZ’s systems.  A decrease 
in the number and severity of reported findings reflect better security outcomes, and 
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reflect YZ’s ability to maintain, patch, and configure the systems at a level consistent 
with the level of external threats.   
External FISMA Assessments: 
I analyzed the reports created by the external FISMA assessors of YZ’s 
environment.  The assessors issued reports in September 2016 and September 2017.  The 
2016 assessment included a review of all 262 controls listed in the FISMA control 
catalogue (NIST Special Publication 800-53, Appendix F).  The 2017 assessment covered 
143 controls, including controls considered “critical” by the assessor, and one third of the 
remaining controls.  The assessor plans to rotate the non-critical controls each year, so a 
full assessment of all controls would occur over a three-year period.  The Department’s 
FISMA requirements for YZ did not require an official Authority to Operate (ATO), so 
the Department did not receive the results and an ATO opinion was not issued.  The 
assessment firm presented the results ranked on a High/Medium/Low qualitative scale.  
The assessment reports included vulnerability scans of YZ’s FISMA-scoped systems.  
The reports provide an indicator of YZ’s compliance with the FISMA regulations as 
required by the Department, and as assessed by a third party. 
 A decrease in the number and severity of action items identified in the report will 
indicate improving security compliance outcomes.   
 Internal Audit Reports: 
I reviewed the reports written by YZ’s internal audit team with a scope that 
included information security processes from January 2010 to September 2017. The 
internal audit director selected areas to be audited based on an annual risk assessment that 
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included input from YZ management and board.  The reports presented findings, 
recommendations, and management action plans.  The findings from 2015 to 2017 ranked 
the impact of the findings on a qualitative scale.   
The internal audit reports assessed information security controls, including 
policies, procedures, and processes.  Recurring findings indicate a higher risk for poor 
security outcomes.  The internal audit reports also assessed systems that were not in the 
scope of the FISMA or penetration test engagements, providing a broader perspective on 
the information security outcomes across YZ’s operations.   
Financial records:   
Financial information on YZ’s annual revenue and expenses were collected from 
YZ’s annual audited financial statements from 2010 to 2017.  YZ’s fiscal year runs from 
October 1 to September 30.  I collected the operating margin data from quarterly reports 
to the YZ board of directors.  YZ’s uses an adjusted operating margin to communicate 
corporate performance to the board, and to calculate annual bonuses.  YZ adjusts the 
number to exclude expenses and revenue not related to corporate performance.  
The financial information is an indicator of the health of YZ, and its ability to 
support its operations.  Financial measures can indicate the amount of energy available to 
the organization as a complex adaptive system.  
Head count: 
I collected the number of employees at YZ corporation from dashboard reports 
provided to the board of directors by YZ management.  YZ’s human resources 
department reported the head count of the organization as calculated at the end of the 
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fiscal year.  The Information Security Officer provided the head count of the information 
security team.   
The changes in head count of YZ and the security team illustrate the resources 
available to generate revenue, secure YZ’s assets, and implement security controls.   
Minutes of Board of Directors meetings: 
Until 2015, YZ held quarterly board of directors meeting, usually occurring in 
March, June, September, and December.  The board agendas focused on planning in the 
March and June meetings, the budget in September, and corporate goals and financial 
statements in December.  I was able to review the December board books for 2011, 2012, 
2013 and 2014 based on the access I was granted by YZ.  The December board books 
contained the agenda for the December meeting, audited annual financial statements, 
minutes from the September meeting, and supporting materials on corporate 
performance.  In 2015 YZ changed the method they used to prepare the board documents 
and held the meetings on a different schedule.  I was able to review the December 2015, 
February 2016, December 2016, February 2017, and May 2017 board materials.  I 
reviewed all materials to identify discussions of information security and corporate 
strategy.  The Head of Internal Audit and Head of IT provided additional background 
information on the board meetings that discussed information security (August 2009, 
February 2016, February 2017, May 2017).  The board minutes and documents provide 
insight into the priorities of compliance and information security, including their 
reasoning behind investments in information security.  These materials document how 
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YZ’s management of information security is communicated and signaled between 
management and the board.   
Results of information security awareness quiz: 
I collected data from the software used to administer the security awareness quiz 
from its 2014 to 2017.  The data includes a record for each employee that completed the 
test, and the number of incorrect responses to each question.  The number of tests 
administered do not match corporate head count numbers due to employee turnover.  
According the HR Trainer, YZ contacts employees and their supervisors until all quizzes 
are complete.  YZ first administered the quiz in 2014.  The quiz data measures YZ 
employee’s information security level of awareness, which may represent the ability of 
the information security team to communicate security and compliance priorities with the 
rest of the corporation.  
 Privacy and security incident reports: 
YZ records information on potential privacy and security incident reports in 
workflow management software.  The available 103 records began with incidents entered 
in the system in October 2011 with the last record dated August 2017.  The data include 
the source of the report, a brief description of the incident, and information on its 
disposition.  The sources of the incident reports include submissions from a corporate 
intranet form, e-mails sent directly to the Information Security Officer or General 
Counsel, and entries created by the Information Security Officer or General Counsel, 
based on information independently obtained.   
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The incident information provides insight into how the employees exercise their 
compliance with YZ policy to report incidents, as well as how changes in the corporate 
complex adaptive system may impact the frequency and type of incident reported.   
 Virus, Spam, and Phishing Reports: 
YZ’s trouble ticket system records all employee reported technical problems that 
was not be resolved by support in the first contact.  I selected virus, spam, and phishing 
items that were logged to the e-mail, security, and desktop categories.  The data include 
when the incident occurred, who reported it, a brief description of the incident, the team 
assigned to resolve it, and when the team resolved the incident.  YZ corporation collected 
this information from October 2011 to August 2016.  Like the incident reports, these data 
reflect the engagement of YZ employees in protecting YZ information assets, and 
compliance with policy regarding reporting incidents.   
Annual Information Technology Budgets 
With a fiscal year that begins on October 1, YZ departments plan their budgets in 
July and August, based on the strategy and objectives established in June board planning 
meetings.  Management consolidates the budgets and present the annual budget to the 
board of directors in the September meeting.  I obtained the budget total for information 
technology department from 2010 to 2017.  The budget includes the anticipated annual 
costs for personnel, software, hardware, and information technology projects.  YZ places 
all software costs in the information technology budget.  The information technology 
budget also includes cloud services.  The budget information I reviewed did not separate 
the items based on their function or role within IT.  For example, I was unable to 
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determine the amount budgeted each year for information security, however the IT 
budget included all information security functions except for training, awareness, and 
physical security.  
The budget is an expression of YZ’s IT strategy for the next year.  Changes to the 
budget, either up or down, reflect YZ’s plan to invest in technology, or its desire to 
reduce cost. 
IT Intensity 
IT intensity is a calculated variable representing the ratio of IT budget to total 
revenue for a fiscal year.  This measure normalizes the IT budget over time to determine 
the year to year investment in IT.  The investment in IT will correspond to the 
investments in information security and compliance.  IT intensity represents the changes 
to the level of energy YZ allocates to information security.  
 Costs of Cloud Implementation 
 Beginning in October 2014, YZ’s IT strategy included an increased focus on 
leveraging cloud-based systems to support business functions while reducing support and 
infrastructure costs.  I collected financial information on the cost to YZ of their 
investments in Software as a Service (SaaS) and other cloud-based systems from January 
2010 to December 2017.  The deployment of the cloud systems may impact the support, 
security, and compliance burden on YZ’s IT team, as well as YZ’s overall security 
outcomes.   
I discuss the results framed within the three concepts of complex systems: 
complex behavior, information signaling, and adaptation. The security outcomes rely on 
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the penetration test results and internal audit assessments.  The level of control catalogue 
implementation will rely on the FISMA compliance assessments.  IT intensity, the 
employee incident reports, and other financial and organizational results will place these 
variables within the context of a complex system to aid the interpretation of the 
outcomes.  The results cover a period when YZ experienced several significant changes 
in corporate leadership, strategic direction, and regulatory requirements. 
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RESULTS 
The results are framed in the context of complexity theory to help determine the 
dynamics between the control catalogue implementation and the security outcomes.  
Some results may apply to more than one complexity principle.  
Table 3 Organization of Results 
Complexity 
principles 
Properties Organization Security Team Outcomes 
Complex 
behavior 
Rules and 
schema. 
Individual agent 
Reactions to 
surrounding 
agents 
Organization 
headcount 
  
 
Privacy and 
Security 
incidents 
Virus, Spam, 
and Phishing 
Incident 
Security Team 
headcount 
 
Information 
Signaling 
Creating and 
transmitting 
signals 
Receiving signals 
Processing 
information 
Board meeting 
minutes 
Internal audits 
Security 
awareness quiz 
 
FISMA 
Assessment 
Adaptation Changing 
schema to 
optimize 
performance 
“Evolution to the 
edge of chaos” 
Gathering energy 
Revenue, 
Expense, and 
Operating 
Margin 
Cloud system 
costs 
IT Intensity 
 Penetration test 
results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the raw data for the information security and financial measures. 
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the normalized data. 
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Table 4 Information Security Variables 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Corporate Head 
Count   634 597 456 405 364 
Security 
Headcount   7 6 3 3 3 
Internal Audit Head 
Count 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 
Employee Reported 
Incidents   24 38 10 20 11 
Spam, Virus, and 
Phishing Reports 
(SVP) 
4 7 6 9 12 5  
Total Completed 
Awareness Quizzes   695 703 585 601 470 
Perfect Scores on 
Awareness Quiz   196 255 205 219 170 
Pentest findings 
(all)   76 89 95 107 80 
 
Table 5 Financial Measures in Thousands of Dollars 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
IT Budget  
 
28,519 27,654 26,621 25,742 24,404 15,287 14,505 
Revenue  
 
190,246 115,206 206,206 104,384 148,962 152,169 265,217 122,173 
Expenses  145,211 95,588 40,144 127,913 98,420 71,192 62,946 59,714 
Cloud cost 19 42 31 27 21 144 146 330 
Adjusted 
Operating 
Margin 
43.24 35.12 40.46 43.69 41.31 44.8 43.9 51.21 
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Figure 1 Graph of Normalized Values 
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Table 6 Values of Normalized Results  
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
IT Intensity 0.2550 0.1730 0.1600 0.0580 0.1190 
Pentest / Headcount  0.1199 0.1491 0.2083 0.2642 0.2198 
Incident/ Headcount 0.0379 0.0637 0.0219 0.0494 0.0302 
Spam Virus Phish / 
Headcount 
0.0095 0.0151 0.0263 0.0123 n/a 
Cloud Cost / IT 
Budget 
0.0010 0.0008 0.0059 0.0096 0.0228 
 
 
IT Investment in Control Catalogue Implementation 
The value of IT intensity is the percentage of revenue dedicated to IT.  I use this 
variable to represent YZ’s investment in the control catalogue.  The lowest point of 
investment in control catalogue implementation is 2016, the same year YZ underwent its 
first initial FISMA assessment.  The level of intensity decreased from just over 25% in 
2013 to slightly more than 5% in 2016, recovering to 12% in 2017.  The 2016 spike in 
revenue contributed to the low that year, but the downward trend reflects YZ’s shifting 
priorities.  Although YZ’s IT team had fewer employees to support, the team still had to 
maintain the static legacy system responsible for 90% of YZ’s revenue.  In addition, the 
IT team was also responsible for deploying and provisioning systems for the New 
Division.  IT budget contains all corporate software and hardware costs, including cloud 
services. 
Of the 262 FISMA controls for YZ’s environment, IT was responsible for 
implementing 231.  YZ’s human resources and building management departments 
implemented and managed the remaining 31 controls, representing 12% of the catalogue.  
These 31 controls represented the Awareness and Training, Personnel Security, and 
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Physical and Environmental Protection control families.  The information security team 
also led the efforts for New Division information security compliance.   
 
Penetration Test 
Table 7 Penetration Test Details  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
External Critical and High 
Findings 0 0 2 1 6 3 
Web Critical and High Findings 0 2 1 1 3 3 
All Critical and High Findings  0 2 3 2 9 6 
All Web Findings 12 5 43 46 54 42 
All External Findings 19 25 46 49 53 38 
All Penetration Test Findings 31 6 89 95 107 80 
 
The number of penetration test findings reached a peak in 2016, the same year the 
investment in IT controls reached its lowest value.  The firm tested the same web 
application each year.  YZ moved three external hosts to a cloud provider in 2016, but the 
report did not reflect a change in scope, since the firm tested the same 128 public IP 
addresses.  The other systems YZ moved to cloud environments were not accessible from 
the internet and were not within scope of the penetration tests. 
The increase in web application findings in 2016 may reflect the aging of the 
legacy customer portal.  Until April 2015, YZ’s Project Management Office developed 
and maintained the web application with the rest of the legacy system.  After the 
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development stopped, a significantly reduced support staff was responsible for 
maintaining the web application infrastructure.  The Information Security Officer 
commented that “patching is hard because the business doesn’t want any disruptions” and 
“scheduling the patches is difficult, especially with the legacy applications.”  The 
Information Security Officer also described the challenge in convincing the IT support 
team of the priority of security changes. 
 
FISMA Assessment Results 
 With only two reports with different scopes and reporting formats, I will analyze 
the FISMA assessment results both quantitatively and qualitatively.  After the 
Department recommended a third-party FISMA assessment in July 2015, YZ hired an 
assessment firm to prepare YZ’s policies, procedures, and standards in a FISMA 
compliant format.  A different team from the same firm conducted the 2016 assessment, 
as well as the 2017 annual assessment.  As mentioned in the narrative, the Department 
did not request copies of either report, but continued to rely on annual self-assessments.  
 The first assessment was conducted in the summer of 2016.  The firm conducted 
the assessment following the NIST assessment guide (SP 800-53A).  The firm reduced 
the scope of the 2017 assessment to only include “key controls” that would be assessed 
annually, and one third of the remaining controls.  The remaining controls would be 
rotated every year, so a complete assessment of all controls would be complete over three 
years.  The firm also changed the method they reported risks.  These changes presented 
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challenges to identify differences in security outcomes.  Table 8 presents the detailed 
results from the two assessments. 
Table 8 FISMA Assessment Results 
 
2016 
Assessment 
2016 
Vulnerability 
Count 
Ratio of 
Controls 
Assessed 
to Risks 
2017 
Assessment 
Ratio of 
Controls 
Assessed 
to Risks 
2017 
Vulnerability 
Count 
Controls 
reviewed 262   143   
Risks – 
High 23 23 9% 1 0.6% 264 
Risks -
Medium 15 7 6% 4 3 % 218 
Risks –  
Low 14 0 5% 3 2% 101 
All Risks 52 30 20% 8 5% 583 
POAM 
Items 54   8   
Repeat 
POAM 
Items N/A   5   
 
The scope of the 2016 assessment included all 262 FISMA controls required for a 
medium risk environment.  The reported risks represented the number of instances of 
non-compliant control.  Some POAM items referenced multiple controls, and some 
controls were listed on multiple POAM items.  The assessor included 30 unresolved 
vulnerabilities identified by YZ’s vulnerability scanner as risk and POAM items in the 
2016 assessment. 
The assessor changed the reporting format for risks and POAM items between 
2016 and 2017.  In 2016 the assessor included a single risk for vulnerability management 
but included individual POAM items to remediate each vulnerability.  In 2017, the 
 46 
assessor reported the scan results alongside the risks as equivalent items in an overview 
of the organization’s risk, and as individual POAM items.  This list was based on the scan 
results YZ provided to the assessor that included systems that were not in scope. 
 The information security team challenged the assessor’s method of reporting risk, 
the scope of the assessment, and the inclusion of each outstanding vulnerability in the 
2017 assessment, but the assessor did not change its report.  The Head of IT said the 
assessors “just took our scan results and spit them back at us.”  Based on an interview 
with the Information Security Officer, a review of the assessment work papers, and a 
review of the 2017 internal audit analysis, the root cause of the numerous outstanding 
vulnerabilities was the inclusion of systems outside the scope of the assessment.  
According to the Security Analyst, the assessor reported vulnerabilities on isolated 
network segments that had a low probability of exploitation.  Other vulnerabilities were 
false positives.  The Security Analyst added that communication with the assessors was 
not optimal, as the security team was also working on high priority project for the New 
Division.  He added that patching the vulnerabilities of the legacy web application 
continued to challenge the IT team, but he felt sufficient compensating controls reduced 
the risk the vulnerabilities posed. 
 The assessment also presented the results in a taxonomically ambiguous fashion.  
The report presented “risks” alongside “vulnerabilities” as units of equivalent value, 
adding them together for an overall risk score.  Although YZ may have been vulnerable 
due to their capacity to remediate legacy applications, the report overstated the magnitude 
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of the risk.  The Head of IT stated that he was uncertain if the same firm will return to 
perform the assessment in 2018.   
Internal Assessments 
YZ’s internal audit department provided independent assessments of YZ’s 
operations, including privacy and information security.  The head of internal audit reports 
to the audit committee chair of YZ’s board of directors.  Between 2010 and 2012, the 
internal audit department consisted of three operations auditors and two IT auditors in 
addition to the head of the audit department.  The audit team conducted annual risk 
assessments using qualitative methods, primarily relying on input from surveys and 
interviews with the board, management, and key staff.  The head of internal audit submits 
the risk assessment and audit plan to the audit committee. Audit staff usually participated 
in IT project team meetings and provided continuous auditing for selected operational 
and IT processes until 2014.    
In late 2014, the head of internal audit left YZ employment, followed soon 
afterwards by other staff.  When the replacement head of internal audit was hired in fall 
2015, only two of the six auditors remained.  The audit department consists of the head of 
internal audit, an operational auditor, and an IT auditor.  
  Full scope audits were between 400 and 600 hours long and took four to six 
months to complete.  Limited scope audits were between 200 and 300 hours, lasting two 
to three months.  Consulting projects were scoped under an engagement memorandum at 
the request of management and were less than 250 hours throughout the fiscal year.  
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Table 9 Internal Audit Assessments 
 
 
The audit results reflect the shift in YZ’s security team’s approach to 
implementation of the FISMA control catalogue.  The September 2010 and January 2013 
audits reported findings that identified the incomplete implementation of the consultants’ 
Date Type Title Findings 
September 2010 Full scope Information 
Security  
The information security team had 
not yet implemented processes and 
procedures for implementing 
recommendations from the third-
party consulting engagement.  
October 2012 Consulting 
Project 
Role Based 
Access Control 
(RBAC) 
The audit team tested the RBAC to 
the RBAC spreadsheet accuracy. 
January 2013 Limited 
scope 
POAM 
Progress 
The security team had not updated 
and maintained the policies, 
procedures, and processes.  The 
report recommended the policies and 
procedures be updated to reflect 
current security processes and 
technology, and an annual review be 
implemented.  
February 2016 Full scope Network 
Security  
The report included two minor 
findings related to maintenance of 
system inventory and incident 
response process documentation.  
September 2016 Full scope Cyber Risk and 
Security (non-
FISMA 
systems) 
The report included three medium 
impact findings: risk assessment of 
cloud services, secure configuration 
of cloud services, and data leak 
prevention configuration.   
November 2017 Consulting 
Project 
Security 
Review Update  
Internal audit issued this 
memorandum to report on 
vulnerability management and the 
second FISMA assessment. 
 49 
recommendations.  The information security team had not maintained the draft FISMA 
compliant policies and had not communicated them to the organization at large.  As a 
result, the policies and procedures began to diverge from organizational practices.  The 
consulting project in 2013 provided the information security team assurance that their 
implementation of the process designed by the consultants worked as intended.   
The 2015 audit on network security found only minor issues, and its scope 
focused on change management and network segmentation.  The September 2016 Cyber 
Risk and Security audit was performed at the request of the board of directors.  The audit 
scope was complementary to the initial FISMA assessment, excluding the legacy system 
being evaluated by the external assessors.  The primary issues identified reflected YZ’s 
strategy to use cloud services for new and replacement systems.  The business areas 
acquired cloud systems without the information security team providing the risk 
assessment and access control assistance.  According to YZ policy, a business unit must 
conduct an information security risk assessment before acquiring a new system.  The 
information security team reviews and recommends mitigation strategies if necessary.  
The audit reported that several business areas completed the risk assessments after the 
contract was signed.  One risk assessment was blank, with a note from the business area 
stating that since it was not a FISMA system, a risk assessment was not required.  The 
audit also identified issues with the minimal effectiveness of the data leak prevention 
(DLP) tool.  YZ deployed the DLP as part of the consultant’s engagement, but the 
product was no longer supported by the vendor.  The security analyst trained on 
configuring the tool left YZ in April 2015 as part of the reduction in force. 
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Privacy and Security Incidents 
YZ policy requires employees to report potential security and privacy incidents 
through a form published on the corporate intranet.  Table 10 represents the type of 
incident by year, and Figure 2 charts the incidents per head count by type from 2013 to 
2017. 
Table 10 Privacy and Security Incidents by Type 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Percent 
of Total 
Misdirected Email 19 20 4 8 3 52% 
Lost Device 1 11 3 8 2 24% 
Other 3 7 2 2 6 19% 
IT/FISMA control 
related 1 0 1 2 0 4% 
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Figure 2 Incident Data by Type Normalized by Headcount 2013-2017 
 
 
The incidents are divided into four types.  Misdirected Email incidents represent 
events where an employee reports an error in the receipt or delivery of email, including 
correspondence to customers and marketing emails.  These reports include incidents that 
may be a violation of regulations not related to information security.  Policy requires 
employees to report lost phones and two-factor authentication tokens, which are 
represented in the Lost Device category.  The response to lost device reports is the 
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deactivation of the device by the information security team.  The four incidents in the IT 
Controls category map directly to a control in the FISMA catalogue, one physical 
control, one application control, and two involving malwares.  The Other category 
records the incidents involving telephone and fax communications, issues with vendors, 
and other incidents that do not fit another category.  The department of YZ that reported 
the most incidents was the department with direct contact with individual customers with 
66% of the reports originating in this area.  The second highest reporting department was 
the sales and marketing areas, representing 13% of reported incidents.    
 
Employee Reported Spam, Virus, and Phishing 
The shorter period and fewer number of observations in this data makes it 
difficult to draw strong inferences on the trend, although it follows a similar pattern as the 
privacy and security incidents.   
When discussing employee incident reporting, the Information Security Officer 
described one January 2016 incident of an attempted business email compromise.  An 
external threat forged the CEO’s email address in a message to a YZ executive.  The text 
of the email requested copies of W-2 tax information for all employees.  The executive 
prepared a reply to the email but did not send it when the executive noticed the forgery in 
the return address.  The executive notified the Information Security Officer, who 
followed up on the incident.  Although no information was compromised, the Information 
Security Officer published a notice about phishing on the intranet and placed a large anti-
phishing awareness poster outside the executive’s office suite.   
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Headcount of YZ Organization  
The headcount of YZ demonstrates a significant shift after the organizational 
changes made by the new CEO in 2015.  According to the Head of IT, the corporate 
restructuring reduced the number of IT by more than half, eliminating the enterprise 
architecture and application development groups, with reduction in IT support across the 
board.  The number and complexity of the business functions were not significantly 
reduced in this period, as the functions made obsolete by the 2010 regulatory change 
were already eliminated in 2012.   
  
Headcount of YZ Information Security Team 
The restructure split and reduced the information security team.  The roles 
responsible for access management and administration of the network security devices 
moved to the IT infrastructure support group.  The remaining team reported to the 
Information Security Officer and included two analysts for managing compliance, 
responding to alerts, and conducting risk assessments.  For six months in 2015, the team 
consisted of a single analyst and the Information Security Officer, as team members 
departed after their colleagues had been laid off.  The Head of IT mentioned that the 
security current staffing appears to be at its minimum, as “there may be problems in 
having enough people to have a separation of duties.”  The Head of IT added that some of 
the security functions are now being managed by cloud vendors and through consulting 
contracts.   
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Financial Performance of YZ Corporation 
Although regulation stopped the primary input to YZ’s revenue generating 
process in 2010, YZ continued to earn a steady revenue stream.  The New Division did 
not contribute materially to the revenue during the period reviewed.  In 2013, YZ’s 
audited financials recorded a single “extraordinary expense” of $248 million.  I removed 
this amount from the analysis numbers to better reflect the usual operating revenue and 
expenses of the organization.  Although the revenue increased, YZ reduced expenses.  
The Head of IT remarked that IT felt the belt tighten as the CFO adjusted their 
performance metrics from on-time project completion to budget reduction.   
The operating margin is an adjusted figure that removes non-performance related 
expenses and revenues from the calculation.  The amounts used to adjust the margin may 
change from one year to the next.  YZ’s operating margin is a target set annually by 
management, and approved by the board, so it is a reliable figure of YZ’s own target for 
financial success.  YZ benchmarked the operating margin against like entities in 2015 and 
discovered the industry maintained an 8.86% operating margin.  The Director of Internal 
Audit stated that, even after the adjustments, “many companies would kill to have YZ’s 
operating margin.”   
From the trends in YZ’s financial performance, the organization is reducing 
expenses, and increasing revenue.  YZ is aware that the revenue from the legacy process 
will eventually decline.  The financials do not yet reflect the investment and revenue in 
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the New Division.  The perception in management of the potential instability of YZ’s 
current state may not be reflected in what appears to be a healthy financial state.   
 
Communications with the Board of Directors  
 From 2010 to 2014, only two board items addressed information security, the first 
to acquire funds to hire a consulting firm to perform a FISMA gap assessment, the second 
the report from consultants.  
In the December 2015 meeting, a board member asked YZ’s new head of internal 
audit to amend the internal audit plan to include a cybersecurity audit.  In February 2016, 
the board held a discussion of enterprise risk management, which mentioned 
cybersecurity as a factor of enterprise risk.  (My review of the board materials available 
did not find subsequent discussions of enterprise risk management.)  At the same 
meeting, the CFO addressed information security in greater detail.  The information 
security document included in the board materials was a list of nineteen items, thirteen 
that identified information security tools, the remaining six closely tied to FISMA control 
families.  The presentation included a description of YZ’s “commitment and investment 
in cyber security,” and YZ’s requirement for FISMA compliance as necessary to future 
federal contracting and as a Department mandate.   
In February 2017, the agenda listed a discussion on IT strategy and cybersecurity, 
and included materials on YZ’s approach, but discussion was postponed for the next 
meeting.  The minutes from the May 2017 meeting describe the Head of IT’s 
presentation.  The Head of IT outlined a flexible strategy that relies on a “bias towards 
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cloud-based solutions” and reserving “costly custom build solutions for fundamental 
unique product offerings.”  “IT staff, the security team, outside resources, and security 
awareness” will be used to achieve its goals of “best practices through policies, standards, 
procedures, vendor management, business continuity, security, and compliance reviews, 
assessments and audits” according to the minutes.  The minutes include a discussion of a 
“consolidated framework for cyber security strategy” that include a “single set of policies 
driving compliance needs.” 
The Head of IT described the board, and one member, as engaged in the 
discussion of security.  That board member requested a standing board agenda item for 
information security.  The board member asked the Head of IT if an incident like the 
2006 breach could happen again.  The Head of IT responded that it would not happen, 
due to the number of controls YZ implemented to prevent a vendor accessing protected 
data, especially non-public personal information.   
Information security communications to the board appear to be evolving from a 
discussion of compliance activities, to preliminary discussions on information risk and 
effective means to manage multiple compliance approaches.  The addition of a standing 
item on information security indicates that some members of the board view information 
security as part of their governance obligations.  The routine meeting with the Head of IT 
establishes a line of communication and information sharing vertically from the board to 
the information security team.   
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The Cloud Strategy 
In the February and May 2017 board materials, YZ’s IT communicated its “bias 
to cloud based solutions” and reducing custom software “fundamental unique product 
offerings.”  The cloud bias began in 2015.  Business areas, sensing a decrease in available 
IT resources, saw cloud options as an attractive alternative.  IT viewed the cloud as a 
primary means to reduce cost and maintain service.  Apart from a marketing and sales 
cloud product, YZ did not begin investing in cloud services until 2015.  YZ began to 
implement a cloud-based security information and event management product in 
September 2015.  According to the Information Security Officer, this implementation 
was designed to replace obsolete systems and reduce the workload on the reduced 
security staff.  The vendor selected was unable to successfully implement a working 
system, and YZ ended the relationship in December 2016.  According to the Information 
Security Officer, “selection of the vendor was a budget decision, but in the end there 
wasn’t enough money.”  He added that “the vendor was new and made promises it 
couldn’t back up.”  According to the Head of IT, YZ still plans to contract with a cloud 
SIEM vendor.  
 Prompted by the obsolescence of its data center back-up solution, YZ’s IT began 
implementing cloud back-up storage for its legacy application in summer of 2017.  In the 
fall of 2016, YZ explored the possibility of moving a sizeable portion of YZ’s legacy 
system infrastructure to the primary hardware vendor’s cloud service.  Executive 
management evaluated the vendor’s proposal and decided against the move due to the 
vendor’s cost estimates.  YZ’s human resource group replaced their benefits, payroll, and 
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employee management systems to a cloud solution in January 2017, and the accounting 
department plans in 2018 to implement a cloud service to replace their on-premise 
system.  IT implemented a cloud replacement for enterprise email and productivity 
software that also included a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) function.  The 
CASB manages security controls to email and the productivity software.  YZ plans to 
implement a cloud replacement for its financial system in May 2018.  “The cloud is a 
mixed bag,” the Head of IT stated, adding that it suits “commodity processes,” but “line 
of business functions should stay here.”  The Head of IT also mentioned that “if you are 
required to use FEDRAMP for a cloud provider, we’ve found that it is usually cheaper to 
keep it on premise: it is saving us a lot of money.”   
 The Information Security Officer and Head of IT both communicated the cloud 
strategy as a cost saving effort.  They agreed that the case of the failed SIEM cloud 
implementation demonstrates that even as a cost saving, YZ should closely evaluate 
prospective cloud vendors.  “In the end, all you have is a service level agreement that you 
hope they hold up,” remarked the Head of IT.  
 
Security Awareness Quiz  
 The error rate on the quiz responses provides an indicator of the signaling of 
information between the information security team and the employees in the rest of the 
corporation.  According to the Information Security Officer, the information security 
team does not examine the results of the quiz.   
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As with the employee reported data, the percent of perfect scores on the quiz 
remains consistent despite the changes to the organization.  YZ’s corporate trainer, who 
manages the quiz software, commented in an interview on the limitations of the quiz.  
The software made changes to the questions difficult, and, in the trainer’s opinion, has 
limited value as a learning tool.  The trainer continues to use the software since it fits a 
specific compliance need not only for information security, but also other corporate 
compliance training.  The trainer stated that other options were being explored, but the 
training resources had been significantly constrained since 2015.   
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DISCUSSION 
What effect did YZ’s FISMA catalogue of controls compliance program have on 
their security outcomes?  Did the Department’s decision to make FISMA controls 
mandatory, and the subsequent assessment, improve the level of YZ’s security?  In this 
section, I discuss the relationship between the investment in IT controls, and the results of 
the penetration test and compliance assessments.  I will also examine how the 
information security department’s interaction with changes in leadership and compliance 
requirements created a vertical emergent process toward the board of directors but did not 
develop a lateral process toward YZ’s other business functions.  Based on these results, I 
will discuss how a compliance-focused control catalogue implementation does not have a 
direct, reliable positive impact on security outcomes, and that organizations seeking to 
establish trust should explore alternatives that require a broader, organization-wide 
examination of risk.  The results will be viewed through the perspective of information 
security at YZ Corporation, and information security when it operates within the 
intersection of multiple complex systems.   
YZ accelerated its decrease in IT intensity in 2015 while implementing control 
catalogues for both the legacy and New Division systems.  As illustrated in Figure 1, 
several measures hit their extreme points in 2016.  IT intensity hits its lowest point, while 
penetration test findings peak and incidents rise.  This confluence of events may have 
brought YZ’s information security team to the “edge of chaos.”  The results for 2017 
reverse direction, as emergent processes evolved within the reduced IT department.   
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Examination of the underlying data reveals a stronger relationship between the 
level of IT investment, the number of penetration test findings, and the qualitative results 
of the FISMA assessments and internal audit reports.  The uncharacteristic increase in 
revenue for 2016 may exaggerate the acceleration of the IT intensity decline, but YZ 
management was unambiguous in its decision to reduce IT investment.  YZ management 
created an IT performance measure based on the cost reduction of legacy support for 
2015 through 2017.  Research into security breaches at hospitals reported that investment 
in IT was not a reliable indicator of a hospital’s level of security, but that other 
organizational culture factors may be more important (Angst et al, 2017).  The study 
identified the integration of security within IT as more important than the investment, a 
process that occurred by necessity at YZ during the reorganization in 2015. 
Due to the 2015 reductions in staff, the IT department had to support processes 
that were now missing key personnel.  The increase in penetration test findings may 
indicate challenges in the vulnerability management program, which contributed to the 
results in the 2016 and 2017 FISMA assessments.  The improvement in penetration test 
results in 2017 reflects the emergence of a process to address the vulnerabilities. 
The privacy and security incident records reflect a different dynamic occurring in 
the organization.  The number of incidents related to IT controls remained low, with only 
four reports in this category over five years.  The number of email and lost device reports 
dropped significantly in 2015 when normalized for headcount.  If the drop in the reports 
were the result of the implementation of a control, one would expect the decline to persist 
beyond 2015, but the incident reports rose in 2016, and remained above 2015 levels in 
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2017.  The incident reports rely on employees to report an event that management may 
perceive as a performance deficiency.  An employee may be more reluctant to self report 
during a period of organizational instability. 
The security quiz scores remained stable throughout this period, with roughly the 
same percentage of the organization overall achieving perfect scores from 2013 to 2017.  
This score persisted despite the changes to the organization and the shifting focus of IT.  
The quiz results may reflect properties of the quiz format more reliably than as a metric 
of how employees would act to protect data.  The primary function of the quiz is the 
implementation of a security control, so stability in the quiz scores should correlate with 
incident reporting.  The stability of the quiz scores when compared with the variation in 
the incident reporting may illustrate a lack of linkage between mandated compliance 
controls and security outcomes.  
Based on the comments of the Information Security Officer, the relationship 
between information security and the rest of the organization was never close.  The 
internal audit findings regarding the difficulties in assessing risks and implementing 
cloud services demonstrate a breakdown in communications between the information 
security team and operational areas.  The information security team did not administer or 
review the results of the awareness quiz, delegating the task to the human resources 
department.  The information security team may not have focused on the quiz or the 
incident reporting processes, since they were in a stable, compliant state.  Despite the 
participation of human resources and building management in security activities, the 
Information Security Officer commented that the corporation at large viewed “security as 
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IT’s job,” a comment that he followed up with the observation that IT and other 
departments “never got along well.”  Parsons’ research on information security culture 
reflects a complex relationship between awareness activities, policy compliance, and 
employee behavior (Parsons et al., 2015).  Bauman describes the tension between 
organizational units as a feature of complex adaptive systems, calling the “concurrency of 
multiple, and often conflicting, performance measures and reward structures, which 
define the goals that decision makers attend to” a “central characteristic of real 
organizations” (Baumann, 2015).  A new emergent process of awareness and incident 
reporting between information security and the rest of the organization does not appear to 
have evolved.   
Although the information processing did not occur laterally across the 
organization, an emergent process evolved vertically as information sharing began 
between the information security team and the board of directors.  The interest in 
information security by a single board member both generated activities by the internal 
audit team and established regular communication with the information security team.  
The comments by the Head of IT reflected that the board member’s interest was focused 
more on reducing the risk of a breach than with compliance and control catalogue 
implementation. 
The challenges of supporting an end-of-life legacy system are illustrated in both 
the penetration test findings and the FISMA assessment.  During this period, YZ made 
few changes to the web application that supports YZ’s legacy business operations.  The 
information security team tried to balance the business needs of system stability and cost 
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reduction against the security and control catalogue requirement to patch vulnerabilities 
in the web application’s core middleware components.  The “cloud bias” strategy is 
unlikely to reduce the effort required by YZ to maintain the web application evaluated by 
the penetration test, but the Head of IT’s assertion that “the line of business should stay 
on-premise” would indicate that the web application will remain the responsibility of YZ.  
The web application is also intertwined with the legacy client server and mainframe 
systems, and it supports a business function that will become obsolete in five to ten years.  
Recent research (Pang and Tanriverdi, 2017) showed that moving legacy systems to the 
cloud can reduce information security risk in federal systems.  For YZ to commit to a 
cloud investment for its legacy web application, the information security risk would need 
to outweigh the risk of moving a complex, end-of-lifecycle system to a FEDRAMP 
compliant environment.  YZ’s IT team may have difficulty in making this case for cloud 
migration to business owners that demand stability. 
The FISMA assessments are targeted directly at the legacy system and the control 
catalogue implementation but provide ambiguous results.  A reader of the two FISMA 
assessments could infer a decline in outcomes from 2016 to 2017.  The 2017 report 
reported an almost hundredfold increase in itemized risks over the 2016 report.  Five of 
the eight 2017 POAM items carried over from 2016, which may reflect a decreased 
ability to remediate control weaknesses.  Combined with information on the loss of 
budget and staff for the IT and security processes, a reader could assume from the 2017 
assessment’s executive summary that YZ’s FISMA program was struggling, a conclusion 
opposed to the results of the penetration tests, which indicate a recovery from 2016 
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results.  YZ’s IT and security teams objected to the assessment team regarding the 
content and format of the 2017 report.   
 The 2017 assessment report combined the presentation of vulnerabilities, risks, 
and controls.  The assessment made no distinction between a risk and a vulnerability in 
its executive summary, and the YZ team felt that a reader would not be able to make the 
distinction between a control weakness and single instance of unpatched software.  The 
security team felt the assessor’s use of YZ’s own vulnerability scan was “throwing our 
own scans back at us.”  The scan included many systems that were not in FISMA scope.  
YZ IT management felt the assessor’s report, based on this information, did not 
accurately communicate YZ’s risks, or YZ’s compliance with the control catalogue.  The 
scan results mapped to a single control (RA-5) of the 262 controls assessed in 2016, and 
of the 143 assessed in 2017.  The assessors’ report did not account for the functions of the 
systems, the assets they stored, or the compensating controls YZ had implemented.  YZ’s 
Information Security Officer expressed concern about the results being misinterpreted by 
two types of assessment readers.  The first type of reader was the Department, an external 
entity that had significant power over YZ.  The second type of reader was YZ’s 
leadership and board of directors, who could view the report as an indicator of YZ 
security program’s deficient performance.   
 The Head of IT and Information Security Officer’s objection is 
fundamental to the nature of the control catalogue used as a compliance measurement.  
Measurement against a compliance framework is designed to provide assurance that the 
“organization has designed and implemented appropriate controls to mitigate cyber risks” 
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(Galligan, 2015).  The framework also provides a path to establish trust with third parties.  
In YZ’s instance, approval by the Department was the primary driver for their move from 
using the control catalogue as a set of best practices to using the control catalogue as a 
mandatory compliance activity.  The information security team felt the assessment report 
was not an accurate reflection of the design and implementation of their controls, and that 
the assessment would not provide the Department with sufficient information to evaluate 
YZ’s security program.  The reliability of assessments to perform trust decisions is not 
unique to YZ’s situation.  Investors question the reliability of financial statements after 
the collapse of firms with audited financials.  Kaplan argued that “shareholders cannot 
assess the quality of an audit report even after its been consumed” (Kaplan, 2007).  
Equifax’s assessors reported compliant states across a number of control catalogues, and 
yet they suffered a catastrophic data breach.  Although YZ’s assessors did not make a 
judgment on YZ’s compliance, the results illustrate the possibility that an ambiguous 
assessment may not allow a trustworthy organization to be trusted.  
YZ’s IT department identified the maintenance of the legacy web application as a 
cause for the numerous risks identified by the FISMA assessors.  The compensating 
controls YZ had deployed to protect the web application appeared to be working as 
intended based on the penetration test reports.  The FISMA reports did not reflect this 
condition.  According to the 2017 internal audit memorandum, YZ’s own internal audit 
department performed significant analysis and verified information with the security team 
before it was able to conclude on the information security risk associated with the results 
of the 2017 FISMA assessment.   
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Freund and Jones mention that they “have yet to see (or even imagine there being) 
an organization that is 100% compliant across its entire risk landscape” (Freund and 
Jones, 2015).  YZ’s concern that the FISMA assessment would not accurately reflect 
their controls implementation may not be unique or unfounded.  In their examination of 
FTC expectations of “reasonable security,”  Breaux and Brummer state that technical 
standards help organizations plan, and “can provide technical guidance that can be used 
to strategize how to comply with security laws”  The approach of “reasonable security” is 
to “thwart attacks and prevent or diminish violations of security laws” (Breaux & 
Baumer, 2011).  YZ had used the FISMA standards and control catalogue in this fashion 
since 2010, and the Head of IT confirmed that they “improved security.”  YZ’s 
information security team did not, however, have experience in managing compliance 
and assessments.  Lance Hayden described information security compliance culture as a 
culture where “the cardinal directive can be expressed as pass audits.” He adds that 
“while ‘good security’ almost always equates to good compliance, becoming a matter of 
translating a security program into the language of whichever auditor is reviewing it, 
good compliance does not necessarily equal good security" (Hayden, 2016).  As 
demonstrated by YZ, the method of translating “good security” to “good compliance” 
may not be an effortless process, and it poses a riskier task for smaller organizations with 
constrained resources.  The system of control catalogues and assessments also demand a 
level of systemic thinking that is counter-productive in a complex system and “may well 
increase the disorder” according to Ralph Stacey (Stacey, 1996). 
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A very pragmatic, tactical recommendation to YZ and other organizations faced 
with information security compliance obligation and limited resources would be to focus 
on the management of the assessment and restrict the flow of information to the 
assessors.  This approach would reallocate resources away from effective security 
controls yet would increase the probability of a certification.  As illustrated by the 
Equifax example, this process would not yield long term business success or maintain 
trust with customer and business partners.   
A longer-term solution should take a broader approach to security compliance 
certification beyond the creation of a checklist of controls.  A security framework that 
examines an organization’s assets, evaluates its industry’s threats, and prioritizes control 
implementation could provide third parties a trustworthy certification.  This approach 
would cost more, take longer, and place an unreasonable burden on smaller 
organizations.  Another potential method would reduce significantly the number of 
controls required for compliance, but the controls could be selected based on the assessed 
organization’s business sector.   
 This research centered on a case study of a single organization, so there may be 
limits on the applicability of the results to other organizations, or to an effective system 
of regulation.  YZ Corporation experienced several significant changes in governance, 
personnel, and strategy during the period studied.  YZ also had an uncommon business 
model, serving a federal government function as a non-profit organization.  This business 
model provides an environment without the influence of traditional stakeholders 
associated with public or private for-profit companies.  Also, YZ did not maintain a set of 
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information security metrics, which would have provided additional data to track security 
outcomes and measure the impact of the compliance effort.  The results do provide an 
illustration of the dynamics of a complex system, and how regulation of control 
catalogues highlight the tension between the goals of trust and the goals of information 
security.   
 Additional research into the impact of control catalogues on security outcomes 
could offer additional insight into the phenomena.  A broader review of different business 
models and stakeholders, and how they approach information security compliance, could 
identify additional models for the dynamics between trust and information security.  
Research into how organizations establish trust, and how reliant they are on third-party 
information security assessments in establishing their trust, could assist organizations in 
determining the level of investment into the assessments.   
  
 70 
CONCLUSION 
 Control catalogues as required by regulation may not have management’s desired 
impact on the security outcomes of an organization.  Regulations with control catalogues 
persist because of their efficiency in providing certification used to establish trust 
between organizations.  Measuring an organization based on its ability to implement a 
selection of best practices may not produce consistent or even representative indicators of 
the organization’s security outcomes.   
 Potential remedies to the problem might include replacing the control catalogues 
with systems that would require the information security team to gather more information 
directly from the business functions and employees.  An alternate method of presenting 
this information could lay a better foundation for informed trust between information 
trading partners, while fully supporting the information security goals.   
 This research has begun to address the gap in the literature that addresses the 
larger issue of the relationship between security compliance and security outcomes.  
Ideally these objectives of compliance and security should be aligned, but the structure of 
compliance as a control catalogue may not be the optimal design to achieve this goal.  A 
regulatory framework should establish trust based on the ability of an organization to 
reduce information security risk, and innovative approaches should be considered.  
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